We analyze the distribution of broadcasting revenues by sports leagues. In the context of an isolated league, we show that when the teams engage in competitive bidding to attract talent, the league's optimal choice is full revenue sharing (resulting in full competitive balance) even if the revenues are independent of the level of balancedness. This result is overturned when the league has no monopsony power in the talent market. When the teams of several leagues bid for talent, the equilibrium level of revenue sharing is bounded away from the full sharing of revenues: leagues choose a performance-based reward scheme. Moreover, if the e®ect of competitive balance is su±ciently low on revenues, the unique equilibrium is a contest: the winner takes all. Our model provides an explanation for the observed di®erences in revenue sharing rules for national TV rights used by the U.S. sports leagues (full revenue sharing) and European football leagues (performance-based reward).
Introduction
The organisation of professional sports in the United States di®ers from the one in Europe in that for each sport, there is one main league (NBA for basketball, MLB for baseball, NFL for american football and NHL for hockey).
1 Consequently, since the movement of talent across the Atlantic is negligible, leagues in the United States enjoy a monopsony position in the market for talent. Thus, when American teams compete to attract the best players, only the distribution of talent is a®ected, while the total amount of talent in the league stays constant.
Conversely, Europe is characterised by one main sport (football) and in each country there is a top domestic league (Premiership in England, Premiµ ere Division in France, Serie A in Italy, Liga in Spain, ...). As a result, European leagues can increase their total amount of talent (and hence, their attractiveness to broadcasters) by poaching star players from a foreign league. For example, one can reasonably assert that when the Brazilian superstar Ronaldo was traded from Barcelona (Spain) to Internazionale (a team from Milan, Italy), the attractiveness of the Spanish league decreased, while that of the Italian League increased.
2 Therefore, in Europe, not only the teams, but the leagues as well have incentives to compete for talent.
Another di®erence between the United States and Europe is the revenue sharing rules used by the leagues. In the United States, revenues from national TV deals are shared in an egalitarian way. As Scully (1995) explains, \National rights are evenly split among the clubs in the leagues without regards to the performance of particular clubs. It is assumed that these shared revenues are determined by leaguewide talent levels." In contrast, in Europe, in countries in which TV rights are sold collectively, the amount a team receives is closely related to its results obtained in 1 As pointed out by Cave and Crandall (2001) , \The NFL, MLB, NBA and the NHL currently have no professional competitors in their respective sports. These dominant positions have existed for at least two decades. Although entry by new leagues has been quite common in earlier decades, only one new league has been formed in the past 20 years."
2 Further evidence of the enhanced attractiveness of leagues with the highest concentration of star players (Italy and Spain) is that every weekend a game from the Italian Serie A is broadcasted in England (ITV) and in the Netherlands (Canal+) and top games from the Spanish Liga and Serie A are broadcasted in France (Canal+) the competition 3 ' 4 (see Tables 1 and 2 ).
The goal of this paper is to show that the use of performance-based reward schemes by European football leagues can be explained by the competitive environment in which they operate. Conversely, the traditional argument of a demand for a balanced distribution of talent does not in itself explain the equal division rule used in the United States.
The intuition for our result is the following. If inter-league movements of players are not restricted and league-wide talent levels in°uence the revenue leagues get from national TV deals, then leagues compete for superstar players. However, they cannot do it in a direct way, since players are hired by teams. Hence, a league wishing to attract top players must provide the incentives for domestic teams to bid a higher price than foreign teams. Now, the value of a player who increases the probability of winning increases with the amount awarded to the winner. Hence, a performancebased reward increases the price domestic teams are willing to bid for top players.
By the above argument, one could rush to the conclusion that competing leagues should choose a winner-takes-all reward scheme. There are two reasons why this is not so. First, by increasing the winner's share the league makes it more di±cult for the team who does not obtain a star player to attract the services of a \good" player. Second, the price paid for the star player is increasing in the share of the championship winner, since it increases the valuations of both domestic teams who then bid up the price.
A special feature of our model is the bidding mechanism we posit for the competitive allocation of talent, which is closely related to recent work on auctions with externalities (see . These auctions are characterised by interdependent valuations, where a bidder does not only care about winning, but also about who gets the object in case she does not win. In our model, if the winner of the auction is from the same league, then losing is not as harmful, since even though the team gets a smaller share, the total revenue 3 There is also less revenue sharing of gate income in European football leagues than in most the of US sports leagues. For example, in England and Italy, there is no sharing of gate income while in Germany only 6% of gate income is paid to the league. In the NFL, 40% of net gate income goes to the visiting team. In baseball, 10% and 20% of gate income goest to the visiting team in the National League and in the American League, respectively.
4 In England, the redistribution scheme also takes into account the number of times a team has been broadcasted.
of the league will remain high. However, if the winner is from the other league, the loss with respect to winning the auction is much higher, since the aggregate talent level of the league decreases.
Several papers have studied the in°uence of revenue sharing on the demand for sport (El Hodiri and Quirk, 1971 , Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart, 1988 , Fort and Quirk, 1995 , Vrooman, 1995 . However, they focus on the optimality of cross subsidies as used in the monopsonistic 5 economy of the United States and do not study the implications of performance-based revenue sharing rules.
The papers most related to ours are those of Hoehn and Szymanski (1999) , Palomino and Rigotti (2000) and Szymanski (2001) . As our model, Hoehn and Szymanski compare a league operating in a competitive environment and an isolated one. They study the impact of the participation of top clubs in international competitions on the competitive balance of the domestic leagues. They do not address the issue of the optimal level of revenue sharing. Palomino and Rigotti consider a multi-period situation in which the demand for sport depends on the aggregate talent level, competitive balance and the e®ort produced by teams. They show that demand maximisation does not lead to full revenue sharing, since even though revenue sharing fosters competitive balance among teams, it also lowers their incentives to win (and hence their equilibrium level of e®ort).
Szymanski considers an isolated league and studies the impact of several types of reward schemes on pro¯t and investment in talent. He¯nds that teams' pro¯ts and investment in talent are increasing and decreasing, respectively, in the level of revenue sharing. Also, when a source of revenue that is sensitive to the level of competitive balance (such as broadcast income) is used to fund a prize, then performance-based reward may lead to a less balanced competition.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 considers the case of isolated leagues. Section 4 analyses the competition between leagues and Section 5 argues the robustness of our results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
5 Fort and Quirk (1995) do address the issue of rival leagues in the US context. However, their main conclusion is that the existence of competing leagues has been a transitory phenomenon, and the pro¯t motives have always led either to a merger or to an exit. In Europe, at least to date, because of the national nature of the leagues, steady state rivalry is feasible. Note however, that the introduction of the Champions' League was a move in the same direction.
The model
We present the simplest possible model that still enables us to address the issue of optimal revenue sharing when there is (potential) competition for players between leagues.
6 There are two leagues, a and b. Each league is made up of two teams, t j;1 and t j;2 (j = a; b). Each team is composed of one player and teams of the same league compete in a championship.
There are¯ve potential players: two players of (relatively) low talent (l) two players of a medium level of talent (m) and one player of high talent (h). The quality of the players in°uences the probability that a team wins the competition. If both teams in a league are of the same level, their probability of winning the championship is 1=2 each. A h-team opposed to a l-team wins the championship for certain, 7 while
Probfm wins against lg= Probfh wins against mg= ¼ with ¼ 2 (1=2; 1).
Leagues sell the rights to broadcast the competition to TV networks and the price networks are willing to pay depends on the quality of the competition, i.e., the level of competitive balance and the quality of the players involved in the league. The level of competitive balance is measured by the uncertainty of a competition. Hence, the smaller the di®erence in the probabilities of winning of the two competing teams (in absolute value), the larger the level of competitive balance. Hence, leagues with two teams of the same quality are the most balanced (since the di®erence in probabilities of winning is equal to zero) while a league with a h team and a l team is the least balanced (since the di®erence in probabilities of winning is equal to 1).
Let K(q 1 ; q 2 ) be the price paid by a network if the two teams participating in a league are of quality q 1 and q 2 . We make the following assumption
The inequalities K(h; m) > K(m; m) and K(m; l) > K(l; l) mean that an increase in skills dominates a decrease in competitive balance, provided that the resulting level of competitive balance is not too low. The inequality K(m; l) > K(h; l) means that an increase in skills is dominated by a decrease in competitive balance when the resulting level of competitive balance is very low. Finally, K(l; l) = 0 is a normalisation, meaning that there is no demand for games played only by ls.
8
Each league splits its broadcasting revenues between the winner and the loser of the championship it organises. We denote ® j¸1 =2 the share which is awarded to the winner. Thus, ® j measures the level of revenue sharing chosen by league j. The two extreme cases are ® j = 1=2 and ® j = 1; which correspond to the league choosing full revenue sharing { thus not rewarding the teams on the basis of their performance { and to a contest, where the winner takes all, respectively.
Following Atkinson, Stanley and Tschirhart (1988) , we assume that a league is a cartel of the teams involved in the championship and its objective is to maximise the teams' joint pro¯t.
9 Note that the maximisation of joint pro¯ts means that, in addition to its revenue from TV deals (K), a league also internalises the cost that obtaining talent in°icts on its teams.
10
The objective of teams is to maximise their expected pro¯t. Teams compete with each other on two levels. First, they compete in an auction to attract the players. Second, they compete \on the¯eld" with the other team from the same league.
We consider the following sequence of events: Leagues a and b choose simultaneously their level of revenue sharing ® a and ® b , respectively. Teams observe ® a and ® b and simultaneously make salary o®ers to h . Following , in order to obviate existence issues, we assume that there is a smallest monetary unit ". h accepts the highest bid.
11 If several teams make the highest bid, h chooses a team randomly. Next, the losing teams bid for the ms. Finally, the team still without a player is allocated one l at zero cost (since it is the only bidder in the auction).
Once the teams are composed, the championships take place.
8 Our model thus¯ts Rosen's (1981) de¯nition of Superstars: a small percentage of an already reduced¯eld of agents who are responsible for most of the traded volume. 9 In practice, the governing body of a league is comprised of one voting representative from each member club and major issues must be approved by majority or supermajority vote. (See Flynn and Gilbert, 2001 ). Here, we implicitly assume that the maximisation of the joint pro¯ts has been approved as the objective of the league and its implementation has been delegated to a commissioner. 10 In the Discussion, we explain how our results change if this assumption is relaxed. 11 Note that this mechanism is not optimal for the h player: he could extract more rent in a menu auction (see Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) , where the losing teams of the same league as the winner would also pay for the positive externality created by the h player's presence in the league.
3 The benchmark case: an isolated league
As a benchmark, we consider the case in which players cannot move across leagues. This corresponds to the case of US sports leagues, in the sense that the aggregate talent level of the league is constant.
In a closed economy, when deciding how much to bid for the acquisition of h, a team knows that if it does not acquire h, then its opponent will. Also the loser of the¯rst auction will be able to obtain the services of an m for free. Hence, for any ®¸1=2, the value of h is
The¯rst term represents the gain of a h-team when opposed to a m-team while the second term represents the expected gain of a m-team when opposed to a h-team. Note that V (®) can be rewritten as
When a league is isolated, its revenue is independent of the level of revenue sharing it chooses. However, the level of revenue sharing does a®ect the price paid for h. Therefore, the league chooses the value of ® that minimises the transfer from the teams to the players.
Proposition 1 When the league's objective is to maximise the joint pro¯ts of teams, it sets ® ¤ = 1=2.
Proof: Since the revenues are constant, the league wants to minimise the price paid for h. Since both teams value him at V (®) this will be the price as well, and the result follows directly from the fact that V (®) is increasing in ®. ² Hence, an isolated league representing the team owners will choose full revenue sharing even in the absence of any competitive balance consideration. Note that the result would be unaltered if we reduced the pool of potential players, as long as there was one preferred over the rest (e.g. fh; m(; l)g or fm; l(; l)g).
In our simple model, this solution would leave the teams without an incentive to win and, therefore, star players would earn the same salary as low quality players. This extreme result is due to the fact that we have not taken into account additional performance-related revenues for the teams like merchandising, part of gate revenues, or local TV deals, which are not re-allocated by the league. In addition, it is widely recognised that teams (both owners and players) have non-pecuniary incentives to win as well. Note, however, that the formal inclusion of these e®ects into the model would not change the revenue sharing result.
Competition between leagues
In this section, we open up the domestic player markets to international competition. Thus, all four teams are bidding for the services of the players. At the same time, the leagues' choices of the levels of revenue sharing are transformed from two independent decision problems into a non-cooperative game, where we look for Nash equilibria. Before turning to the leagues' problem, we need to characterise the equilibrium of the sub-game following an arbitrary pair of revenue-sharing rules, so that we can identify the leagues' payo®s.
When bidding for h, a crucial concern of a team is whether its adversary is expected to obtain the services of an m. Denote by V (mjy; ®) the value of an m to a team whose adversary has a y player (y = h; m; l). If V (mjh; ® a ) > V (mjm; ® b ), then the teams of league a know that upon obtaining h they will play in a (h; m) ¡league, hence sharing an amount K(h; m). In such a case, the teams from league b will share an amount K(m; l). Conversely, if V (mjh; ® a ) < V (mjm; ® b ), then the teams of league a know that upon obtaining h they will play in a (h; l) ¡league, hence sharing an amount K(h; l) and the teams from league b will share an amount K(m; m).
Assume that team t a;1 gets h. Then, the value of an m to team t a;2 is
while the value of an m to a team from league b given that the opponent gets an m is
It follows that V (mjh; ® a ) > V (mjm; ® b ) is equivalent to
Two cases have to be considered:
0. In such a case, there exists ¹ ® 2 (1=2; 1] such that if ® a < ¹ ® and ® b < ¹ ®, then V (mjh; ® a ) > V (mjm; ® b ) implying that the league which obtains h also obtains an m.
12 Therefore, if team t a;1 obtains h, then in the bid-for-m stage, there exists an equilibrium such that team t a;2 bids V (mjl; ® b ) + ", teams from league b bid V (mjl; ® b ), and team t a;2 gets an m, where
It follows that at the bid-for-h stage, teams from league a bid V (hjm; ® a ; ® b ) and teams from league b bid V (hjm; ® b ; ® a ) where
The¯rst term represents the expected gain of a h-team given that the opponent s a m-team, the second term represents the expected gain of a m team given that the opponent is a h-team;¯nally, the last two terms represents the amount saved from not having to pay for a m player in the bid-for-m stage.
We deduce from (6) that if ® a > ® b then h chooses a team from league a, if ® b > ® a then h chooses a team from league b while if ® a = ® b , h randomises between four teams since they all bid the same amount for h.
Assume that a team from league a gets h, then the joint pro¯t of teams from league a is
Similarly, the joint pro¯t of teams from league b is
If ¹ ® > ® a = ® b , then the expected joint pro¯t of teams from league j (j = a; b) is
12 ® is given by the minimum of 1 and the solution to (5) as an equality when ® a and ® b coincide.
Now, consider the case
At the bid-for-m stage, teams form league b bid V (mjh; ® a ) + " and obtain an m. Therefore, at the bid-for-h stage, teams from league j (j = a; b) bid
If ® a > ® b then h chooses a team from league a while if ® b > ® a , then h chooses a team from league b. If ® a = ® b then h randomises between the four teams.
We deduce that if ¹ ® > ® a > ® b , the joint pro¯t of teams from league a is
and the joint pro¯t of teams from league b is
The reason is that h randomises between the four teams but the league which obtains h never gets an m. Hence, we cannot have an (h; m)-league in equilibrium.
For any set of parameters, we now have the joint pro¯t of a league as a function of its level of revenue sharing and that of its opponent. Therefore, we can turn to the game played by the two leagues. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 There is no equilibrium such that the leagues choose full revenue sharing.
0. Recall that {for ® close to 1/2{ this implies that whichever league obtains h will always obtain an m, subsequently. Let ® b = 1=2 < ¹ ®. Since V (hjm; ®) is increasing in ®, if ® a > 1=2 league a obtains h and its joint pro¯t is ¦(h; m; ® a ; ® b ). If ® a = ® b , then the expected joint pro¯t of league a is E(¦j1=2) = (¦(h; m; 1=2; 1=2) + ¦(m; l; 1=2; 1=2)) =2; since h randomises between the four teams.
Consequently, league a will have an incentive to adopt a performance related scheme, whenever ¦(h; m; 1=2; 1=2) > ¦(m; l; 1=2; 1=2). Substituting in, this is equivalent to K(h; m) ¡ 2" > K(m; l), which always holds if " is small enough. Therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium such that both leagues choose ® = 1=2. Now, assume that K(h; l) ¡ (2¼ ¡ 1)K(h; m) > 0. Recall that {for ® close to 1/2{ this implies that whichever league obtains h will always obtain an l, subsequently.
If ® a = ® b then h randomises between the four teams. Then the expected joint pro¯t of league a is
League a will have an incentive to adopt a performance related scheme, whenever ¦(h; l; 1=2; 1=2) > ¦(m; m; 1=2; 1=2). Substituting in, this is equivalent to 0 > K(m; m) ¡ K(h; m) ¡ 2", which always holds. Therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium such that both leagues choose ® = 1=2. ² Proposition 2 implies that when leagues compete for the players then in any symmetric equilibrium both leagues choose a performance-based reward scheme. The level of partial revenue sharing chosen in equilibrium is parameter dependent. In what follows we provide two representative examples. One in which the winner gets all (i.e., ® j = 1, j = a; b) and one in which leagues choose some level of revenue sharing (i.e., ® j = ¹ ® 2 (1=2; 1), j = a; b). . We deduce that ® ¤ is a best reply to ® ¤ .
Discussion
In this section, we will argue that the conclusions based on the analysis of the seemingly restrictive model of the previous sections are surprisingly(?) robust.
Alternative objective functions
We have assumed that the objective function of the leagues is to maximise their domestic aggregate net surplus. This may not be the case in general, since not all teams incur the cost of hiring talent with equal probability. In this case, teams are likely to bargain over the fraction of expenses the league should internalise in its objective function. Consequently, it seems more realistic to assume that the league will internalise the expenses of the clubs only partially. In other words, the true objective function of a league is somewhere in between the maximisation of joint revenues and the maximisation of aggregate net surplus. Note, however, that under this, more elaborate, hypothesis our results would remain unchanged. The reason is that the teams' valuations of h, just as before, are increasing in ®. Therefore, full revenue sharing (i.e., ® = 1=2) cannot be an equilibrium.
Other sources of income
We have considered the case in which teams have only one source of income. If there are multiple sources of income, two cases have to be di®erentiated: all incomes are subject to revenue sharing and some incomes are not subject to revenue sharing. However, in either case, our results remain unchanged.
If all the sources of income are subject to revenue sharing then an increase in the sharing of any source of revenue decreases the value of top players for teams. Therefore, a league choosing ® = 1=2 never attracts h. It follows that leagues still choose performance-based revenue sharing rules in equilibrium.
If some income is not subject to revenue sharing but is increasing in performance, the value a team is willing top bid for h or for an m is increasing in ®. Therefore, results remain unchanged: leagues choose performance-based revenue sharing rules.
Asymmetric leagues
The model we consider assumes that revenues from the sale of broadcasting rights are the same in the two leagues as a function of teams' quality. This may not be the case. For example, if the two leagues organise domestic competition in two countries of di®erent population size, then it is likely that the league of the larger country has higher broadcasting revenues for a given quality of the competition. In this respect, assume that K a (q 1 ; q 2 ) = K b (q 1 ; q 2 ) + H (H > 0). In such a case, for any
This implies that there exists ® a < ® b such that league a attracts h and an m. It follows that in equilibrium, 1=2 < ® a < ® b 1: both leagues choose a performancebased reward scheme but the richer league (i.e., league a) chooses a higher level of revenue sharing.
Budget constraints
In a previous version of this paper (Palomino and S ¶ akovics, 2000) , we have analysed a model where there are only two player types but the teams face a budget constraint. They can only spend on the players an amount that they can surely afford by the end of the season. The results are similar to those of the current paper. Here the incentive to keep competing leagues from o®ering fully performance based rewards is that the lower the loser's share is the stricter the budget constraint becomes. In the limit as the cost of bankruptcy disappears, the only equilibrium is both leagues o®ering a winner takes all system.
Conclusion
We have analysed the distribution of broadcasting revenues by sports leagues which maximise their teams' joint pro¯t. In the context of an isolated league, we have shown that when the teams engage in competitive bidding to attract talent, the league's optimal choice is full revenue sharing (resulting in full competitive balance) even if the revenues depend on the level of competitive balance. This result is overturned when the league has no monopsony power in the talent market. When the teams of several leagues bid for talent, the equilibrium level of revenue sharing is bounded away from the full sharing of revenues: leagues choose a performance-based reward scheme. These results hold even if teams have multiple sources of income either subject or not to revenue sharing or if leagues are asymmetric.
We thus provide an explanation of the observed di®erences in revenue sharing rules used by the U.S. sports leagues and European football leagues. In the US, each league is a monopsonist and splits revenues from national TV deals evenly among teams. Conversely, in Europe, domestic football leagues compete for talent and, when TV rights are sold collectively, use a performance-based scheme to redistribute broadcasting revenues to teams.
Finally, note that the underlying intuition of our analysis is not restricted to sports and is exportable to other spheres of economic activity. Consider, for example, oligopolistic¯rms of di®erent countries competing for (scarce) foreign direct investment. In this set-up, our results imply that, in equilibrium, the governments of these countries would put relatively lenient competition policy barriers in place, in order to enhance their¯rms' competitive position. 
